What is adulthood? In one way, our Constitution specifies adulthood, with the Twenty-sixth Amendment:

Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.

Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Much of the impetus for this came from the Vietnam war, in which 18-and-19-year-olds could be and were drafted and sent to fight in Southeast Asia, but most states had set their voting ages at 21. Growing up in Kentucky, I did have that then-rare privilege of being able to register to vote at 18, as both Georgia and the Bluegrass State had previously lowered their voting ages to 18, but it barely made a difference: the only election in which I was able to vote as an 18-year-old when such wasn’t available in all of the other states was the May primary in 1971. 🙂

Nevertheless, adulthood has had different definitions throughout time, for different purposes. The ages of consent for sex vary across our country, set by the states, not the federal government, and several of them specify 16 or 17 as the age of consent. And, in our then older, wider Western civilization, most people were married by age 16, if not earlier. Eleanor of Aquitaine, for example, was first married at age 13, and such was in no way unusual in the twelfth century. Her eldest son, Henry the Young King, was married at age 17, though his father, King Henry II, waited until the ripe, old age of 19 to marry Eleanor! Marriage at an age in which girls were still in puberty was considered a societally and religiously practical thing, as it kept illegitimacy down.

And now come Tina M. Zottoli, an associate professor in the department of psychology and director of the Legal Decision Making Lab at Montclair State University, Tarika Daftary-Kapur, a professor of justice studies at the same school, and Kim Echevarria, a doctoral student in the department of psychology there. Though they say nothing about ages of consent for sex, or to be able to vote, they are very, very upset that 18-year-olds are being held responsible as adults for breaking the law:

An 18-year-old is not an adult, brain science shows. The criminal justice system is failing our kids.

The criminal justice system must stop considering teenagers as adults, and offer more chances for rehabilitation to people in their late teens and early 20s.

by Tina M. Zottoli, Tarika Daftary-Kapur, and and Kim Echevarria, For The Inquirer | Ash Wednesday, February 14, 2024 | 7:00 AM EST

In November, the state of Texas executed Brent Brewer for a homicide he committed in 1990, when he was 19 years old. If Brewer had committed the crime a day shy of his 18th birthday, he would be alive today. In fact, he might even be free.

That’s how much difference a day can make.

The authors go on to tell us that:

In 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States abolished the death penalty for people whose crimes were committed before age 18. Then, between 2010 and 2016, the court tightly restricted the cases for which a youth could receive a sentence of life without opportunity for parole. As a result, the number of people serving sentences of life without parole for crimes they committed as teenagers dropped from 2,300 in 2016 to fewer than 1,500 in 2020.

But you know what the three academics don’t tell us? They don’t give readers the name of Robert Laminack. Mr Laminack got his death sentence in 1990, at the hands of Mr Brewer. Mr Brewer has now been sent to his eternal reward, and, on this Ash Wednesday, a committed Catholic like me can at least hope that he repented of his sins and sought absolution for them, that his eternal reward might not be Hell.

As our regular readers, both of them, know, I am opposed to capital punishment; I wish that Mr Brewer had not been executed. However, one almost throwaway sentence from the authors really annoys me:

In fact, he might even be free.

Well, yes, he might, but whether still behind bars, or released from prison, Mr Laminack would still be stone-cold graveyard dead. The authors, who couldn’t even bring themselves to name Mr Brewer’s victim, seemingly don’t care about that. As we previously reported, 17-year-and-363-day old Quadir Humphrey has been charged with the apparently-senseless murder if 16-year-old Tyshaun Welles, when he (allegedly) fired almost randomly into a crowd at the Philadelphia City Hall SEPTA subway station. The three academics wrote, ” The court further acknowledged — correctly — that youth who commit crimes can be rehabilitated.”

Well, young Mr Humphrey wasn’t rehabilitated, despite being in custody, twice, on June 4, 2021 on a gun charge, and again on March 4, 2023, on a stolen car charge, neither of which had been adjudicated on the day that he (allegedly) shot Mr Welles. Even if charged and prosecuted as an adult, Mr Humphrey, if convicted, cannot be sentenced to either death or life without parole, but Mr Welles will still be dead. That, to paraphrase the three academics, is how much difference two days can make.

Our work following juvenile homicide offenders released from sentences of life without parole in Philadelphia shows that the court got the science right. Among the first 174 released, only six (or 3.4%) were rearrested within an average two-year follow-up, and only two (or 1.1%) were convicted, both for minor offenses. In comparison, the two-year rearrest rate for homicide offenders nationally is 30%.

Like Brewer, some of the individuals in our study had originally been sentenced to death. But unlike Brewer, they had not yet turned 18 when they committed their crimes, so they were given a chance to show us that they could change.

Those paragraphs fall under the category of lies, damned lies, and statistics! From the City Controller’s office, on January 15, 2022:

The increase in gun violence coincided with other concerning gun-related trends. As gun violence surged over the last six years, clearance rates — the share of cases solved by the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) — for homicides and non-fatal shootings declined. In 2020, just 37% of fatal shootings were cleared by the PPD. At the same time, the number of individuals arrested for illegal gun possession increased by more than 100% between 2015 and 2020. While gun possession arrests have drastically increased, conviction rates — the share of cases prosecuted by the District Attorney’s Office (DAO) that result in conviction — for gun possession declined. Between 2015 and 2020, the share of illegal gun possession cases resulting in conviction fell from 65% to 42%. . . . .

In 2015, clearance rates for non-fatal shootings were already low at 27%. As non-fatal shooting victims increased by more than 80% from 2015 to 2020, clearance rates continued to decline. The clearance rate reached a low point in 2020, when only 19% of non-fatal shooting incidents were cleared by the PPD. This clearance rate translates to nearly 1,500 non-fatal shooting incidents for which no arrest was made in 2020.

So, when the three academics tell us that the arrest and conviction rates were low in the City of Brotherly Love, they are basing their claims on statistics from a crippled Police Department under the thankfully-departed, failed Commissioner Danielle Outlaw, and the refusal of the George Soros-sponsored, police-hating and criminal-loving District Attorney Larry Krasner to seriously prosecute some crimes, including gun crimes.

More, the authors restricted their statistical study to “an average two-year follow up,” something which is not only a short period of time, but one which, if they described it accurately in their article in the Inquirer, was shorter than two years in some cases.

The authors indicated their bias in their own linked (supposedly) academic study, when they stated:

Moreover, in light of the growing recognition that addressing the incarceration epidemic will necessitate re-evaluation of long-term prison sentences for individuals who were convicted of violent offenses, these outcome data have implications far beyond just those that pertain to the resentencing and release of juvenile lifers.^[1]Resentencing of Juvenile Lifers: The Philadelphia Experience, page 1 of the report, page 2 of the .pdf file.

On page 3 of the document, the authors refer to the “crisis of mass incarceration,”^[2]ibid, page 3 of the report, page 4 of the .pdf file. as though mass incarceration is a problem, rather than not enough people being incarcerated, for not a long enough period of time.

Considering that the overwhelming majority of individuals who commit crime — even serious crime—“age out” of criminal behavior, the societal benefits of continued incarceration are called into question, especially in comparison with the costs.^[3]ibid, page 3 of the report, page 4 of the .pdf file.

There is a huge problem with the study. The authors are speaking, in the quoted parts above, about offenders previously sentenced to life, or what they have referred to as “virtual life,” by which they mean sentences of 50 or more years, studied in a re-sentencing project, but drawing inferences on juvenile offenders whom they hope to receive much shorter sentences. As they stated previously:

A subset of 38 cases were considered for resentencing by both the prior and current administrations. The average sentence offered in these cases by the prior administration (District Attorney Seth Williams) was 38.8 years; under Krasner, the average offer in these cases was 27.6 years. Across all cases, this difference equates to an additional reduction of 394 years.^[4]ibid, page 2 of the report, page 3 of the .pdf file.

An offender really can “age out” of prime criminal activity years, after he has spent 38.8 years, or even 27.6 years, behind bars, but the type of lenient treatment the authors like and want to see continued under Mr Krasner when it comes to juveniles, does not lead to any ‘aging out’.

On page 6 of the report, page 7 of the .pdf file, the authors note that all of the juvenile offenders resentenced following a life sentence were murderers,, meaning that their victims are dead, never again to draw another breath of life. They noted that 38% of them were convicted of Second degree murder, felony murder, which means a homicide committed during the commission of another felony, robbery (78%, home invasion (16%), and “drug-related” offenses (6%), but does not require that the convicted be the one who actually pulled the trigger. The verbiage is such that the reader could infer that none of the 38% were the ones who pulled the trigger, but the charge of First-degree murder in Pennsylvania requires premeditation, not just the adrenaline-fueled, split-second reaction involved in a felony.

In their Inquirer OpEd, the authors concluded:

Of course, whenever a line is drawn, there will be errors at the margins. But if we, as a nation, continue to maintain the most severe of criminal sanctions — the death penalty, and life without parole — and if we justify these sanctions partly on the basis that they ought to be reserved for people who cannot be reformed, we must acknowledge that the dividing line between 17 and 18 years mistakenly classifies far too many young people as irredeemable.

And therein lies the assumption which destroys their entire article: “if we justify these sanctions partly on the basis that they ought to be reserved for people who cannot be reformed.” Not just no, but Hell no! When the result of the crime is that someone else is killed, we should not be looking at whether or not his killer can or cannot be reformed, but the fact that someone’s life was taken from him, and that the killer should not be released until the dead person comes back to life.